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ABSTRACT:  (240 words) 
 
 
In Article 8 ECHR privacy right jurisprudence, photographs are deemed distinct forms of 
information that are particularly intrusive nature.  This article is concerned with explaining 
why this is so.  3DUW  H[DPLQHV WKH QRWLRQ RI µLQWUXVLRQ¶ LWVHOI  ,W DUJXHV WKDW µLQWUXVLRQ¶
functions as a legal metaphor and plays an important role in constructing a binary between an 
RXWHUVHOISUHVHQWHGWRWKHZRUOGDQGDµVSLULWXDO¶HPRWLRQDOLQWHULRUWKDWSULYDF\SXUSRUWV to 
protect from transgression.  Part 2 argues WKDW WKDW WKLV µVSLULWXDO LQWUXVLRQ¶ PHWDSKRU is 
influential in the continental personality right that LQIRUPV WKH(&W+5¶VDSSURDFK WR$UW
protection for photographed individuals.  This leads to potentially stronger protection for 
image, including a basic Art 8 right to control oQH¶V LPDJH  <HW WKHUH LV D GLYHUJHQFH RI
approach in the English courts, where personality theory has limited influence; here there is 
traditional scepticism towards an image right and photographic capture is largely neglected.  
Part 3 argues that photography becomes a relevant factor at publication stage, where courts 
agree that the distinctive features of the medium may cause or exacerbate intrusion.  This is 
because photography creates a permanent, infinitely replicable µWUXWKIXO¶ record of the 
iQGLYLGXDO¶VLPDJHWKDWFDQEHGLVVHPLQDWHGWRWKHREMHFWLfying gaze of a mass audience.  But 
the medium also leads viewers to overlook its inherent complexities and ambiguities.  
Ultimately, Article 8 jurisprudence, particularly in the ECtHR, occasionally adopts reasoning 
WKDWFRQWDLQVHFKRHVRIWKHµSKRWRJUDSKVVWHDOVRXOV¶P\WKRORJ\ 
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6WHDOLQJµ6RXOV¶"$UWLFOH	3KRWRJUDSKLF,QWUXVLRQ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Photography: an art form; an industry; a ubiquitous VRFLDO SUDFWLFH DQG D µWRRO RI SRZHU¶.1  
Susan Sontag, the cultural commentator who coined this latter term, noted the mass 
proliferation of photographs, claiming they µalter and enlarge our notions of what is worth 
looking at and what we have a right to observe¶2  Yet as early as 1931, Walter Benjamin 
claimed that the social functions of photography, rather than its aesthetic implications, 
warranted investigation.3  ,W LVSKRWRJUDSK\¶Vsocial and ethical implications, its effects as a 
µtool of power¶, that Article 8 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) privacy case 
law has had to address.  It is perhaps inevitable that the pUDFWLFHRISKRWRJUDSK\ZKLFKµbegan, 
historically, as an art of the Person: of identity, of civil status¶4 should have come to engage 
issues regarding the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life,5 which encompasses 
DSHUVRQ¶VLPDJH6 identity7 and control over personal information.   
 
This article investigates photographs of people in Article 8 case law in the ECtHR (European 
Court of Human Rights) and English courts.  It particularly draws upon misuse of private 
                                                          
x I would like to thank Ian Cram, Adam Ramshaw and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this piece.  The usual disclaimers apply. 
 
1
 Susan Sontag, On Photography (Penguin 1979) 8 
2
 ibid 3. 
3
 Walter Benjamin, A Short History of Photography (Penguin) 22. 
4
 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (Vintage 2000) 79.   
5
 Article 8(1), European Convention on Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms. 
6
 Schussel v Austria [2002] app 42409/98, Complaints [2]; Sciacca v Italy (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 20 [29]. 
7
 µ>3@ULYDWHOLIHH[WHQGVWRDVSHFWVUHODWLQJWRSHUVRQDOLGHQWLW\VXFKDVDSHUVRQ¶VQDPHSKRWRRUSK\VLFDODQG
moral integrity.¶5RWKHY$XVWULD>@(&+5>@6HHDOVR5HNORV	DQRWKHUY*UHHFH>] 27 
BHRC 420 [39].  
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information (MPI), a common law tort where courts balance the Article 8 privacy rights of 
claimants who wish to prevent publication of private information (including photographs) 
against the Article 10 free expression rights8 of media defendants.  The action is thus concerned 
with the rights that Article 8 may afford the subject of a photograph, as distinct from the rights 
of the photographer and/or copyright owner.9  The privacy right analysed here can also be 
distinguished from the commercial interest in exploitLQJRQH¶V image.10 
 
Though both the medium of photography and the legal protection of image have been subject 
to a good deal of academic attention, much of the latter is American and tends to focus on 
historical matters and/or commercial image rights.11  More importantly, no sustained attention 
has been paid to ascertaining why the photographic medium is deemed distinct from, and more 
intrusive than, other forms of information.  This article analyses judicial approaches to 
photographs in Article 8 case law to address this very issue.  Though it identifies diverging 
approaches to the degree of protection that Article 8 may afford the subjects of photographs, it 
does not seek to advance any argument in this regard (though, of course, it may be used as basis 
for such future work).  Instead WKLV DUWLFOH¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ OLHV LQ RSHQLQJ XS SULYDF\ ODZ
discourse to reveal the cultural-historical influences that shape legal understandings of both 
intrusion and the medium of photography.  In doing so, it seeks to uncover the non-rational 
elements that remain sedimented in the history of contemporary rational legal discourse, and 
to ascertain whether such traces which have legal influence. 
                                                          
8
 Article 10, European Convention on Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms. 
9
 The photographer who takes a photograph is the author and (in most cases) owner of copyright in that work.  
Sections 9 and 11 Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988.  The owner of a copyright work has the exclusive 
right to commercially exploit the work (section 16).   
10
 3URWHFWLRQ IRU FRPPHUFLDO LPDJH ULJKWV YDULHV DFURVV MXULVGLFWLRQV  ,Q WKH 8. D FHOHEULW\¶V LPDJH FDQ EH
protected by intellectual property laws, most notably copyright, passing off and breach of confidence.  In the 
US law there is an additional commercial appropriation tort.  In continental jurisdictions such as Germany, 
rights to control commercial exploitation of image are covered by the personality right.   
11
 Though some articles involve discussion or comparison of privacy and commercial publicity rights: Jeffrey 
0DONDQ µ6WROHQ 3KRWRJUDSKV 3HUVRQDOLW\ 3XEOLFLW\ DQG 3ULYDF\¶  YRO  7H[DV /DZ 5HYLHZ 
-RQDWKDQ.DKQµ%ULQJLQJ'LJQity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation 
RI,GHQWLW\¶YRO&DUGR]R$UWV	(QW/-5REHUW&3RVWµ5HUHDGLQJ:DUUHQDQG%UDQGHLV3ULYDF\
3URSHUW\DQG$SSURSULDWLRQ¶&DVH:HVWHUQ5HVHUYH/DZ5HYLew, vol 41, 647 
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Part 1 discusses WKH WHUPLQRORJ\ RI µLQWUXVLRQ¶, and how this crucial metaphor in privacy 
discourse evolved in the late nineteenth century, partly in response to concerns about new 
photographic technology2ISDUWLFXODULQWHUHVWLVWKHLQWUXVLRQPHWDSKRU¶VUROHLQFRQVWUXFWLQJ
the notion of an inner spiritual sanctum that may be invaded.  Part 2 proceeds to argue that that 
WKLVµVSLULWXDOLQWUXVLRQ¶PHWDSKRULQIRUPVWKH(&W+5¶VDSSURDFKWR$UWand photography.  
Its approach, rooted in the continental personality right, VHHVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLmage as closely 
correlating to - indeed determining - WKHLU µLQQHU¶ self or spirit; as such, it suggests greater 
SURWHFWLRQIRUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLPDJHHYHQDWFDSWXUH stage.  In contrast, the English courts, less 
LQIOXHQFHG E\ QRWLRQV RI SHUVRQDOLW\ DQG WKH µVSLULWXDO LQWUXVLRQ¶ PHWDSKRU DUH ZDU\ RI
protecting image and neglect photographic capture.  Part 3 analyses the characteristics of 
photography which mark it out as a distinctive medium that can cause or exacerbate intrusion 
at publication stage.  It finds that courts treat photographs as particularly intrusive because they 
create a permanent, detailed visual record of an individual at a given moment, and can enable 
that person to be subjected to the actual or potential gaze of multiple spectators.  Furthermore, 
VXFKLPDJHVJHQHUDOO\HQMR\WKHVWDWXVRIµWUXWK¶GHVSLWHWKHLUOLPLWHGFRQVWUXFWHGQDWXUH   
 
The photo/text distinction 
 
In Article 8 disputes judges employ a photo/text distinction, viewing photographs as a form of 
information that is innately different to text-based information.  When considering whether a 
disputed story violates Article 8, the courts split the material into discrete categories, and may 
allow publication of certain features (e.g. the bare facts of a story) whilst restricting others (e.g. 
WKHFODLPDQW¶VLGHQWLW\RUVDODFLRXVGHWDLOV  For these purposes, stories are routinely split into 
textual and photographic elements.  For example, Theakston concerned a claimant television 
SUHVHQWHU¶V DWWHPSW WR SUHYHQW SXEOLFDWLRQ RI D VWRU\ DERXW KLV YLVLW WR D EURWKHO including 
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photographs of him taken whilst there.12  Ousley J split the proposed story into three elements 
- the bare fact of the brothel visit, details of the sexual activity in the brothel and the 
accompanying photographs - claiming that different considerations applied to each.13  He 
granted an injunction to restrict the details and photographs, but not the bare fact of the story 
which had a public interest dimension.  Similarly, in the leading case of Campbell, the Law 
Lords dealt with photographs of the claimant on a street leaving a Narcotics Anonymous 
meeting separately to the main story, seeing the photographs as the last of five categories of 
information.14  This text/image distinction has been explicitly confirmed by the highest English 
courts.  In Douglas the Court of Appeal stated: 
 
µSpecial considerations attach to photographs in the field of privacy.  
They are not merely a method of conveying information that is an 
alternative to verbal description.  «As a means of invading privacy, a 
photograph is particularly intrusive¶15   
 
A text/photograph distinction was also acknowledged when Douglas reached the House of 
Lords; despite his dissenting judgement, Lord Walker acknowledged that µ(QJOLVKODZKDV«
recognised that there may be something special about photographs¶.16  The recent case of Ali 
confirmed that these points about photography are equally applicable to the visual medium of 
film.17  The µVSHFLDO¶QDWXUHRISKRWRJUDSKLFLQIRUPDWLRQKDVDOVREHHQQRWHGE\the ECtHR in 
Von Hannover (No 1) which involved photographs of the applicant, Princess Caroline of 
                                                          
12
 Theakston v MGN [2002] EWHC 137 [77]. 
13
 ibid [24]. 
14
 /RUG 1LFROOV GLVVHQWLQJ DFFHSWHG WKH FODLPDQW¶V FRXQVHO¶V VSOLWWLQJ XS RI WKH &DPSEHOO VWRU\ LQWR YDULRXV
HOHPHQWV WKHILIWKRIZKLFKZDVWKHµYLVXDOSRUWUD\DORIKHUOHDYLQJDVSHFLILFPHHWLQJZLWKRWKHUDGGLFWV¶
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 [23] (Lord Nicholls).  See also: [88] (Lord Hope). 
15
 Emphasis added.  Douglas & Others v Hello! [2005] EWCA Civ 595 [84].  Quoted in Mosley v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 [19].  See also: Rothe (n 7) [74]; Jagger v Darling & Others [2005] 
EWHC 683 [11], [14], [15]. 
16
 Douglas & Others v Hello! [2007] UKHL 21 [287].  See also: [288].  
17
 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2018] EWHC 298 [150]-[151].  Though this article focuses on photographs, 
much of the analysis is thus also broadly applicable to related visual media such as film and video. 
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Monaco, going about her daily life, e.g. eating in restaurants, shopping and participating in 
sports.  Here the court stated that the 
 
µSXEOLFDWLRQRISKRWRV«LVDQDUHDLQZKLFKWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHULJKWV
and reputation of others takes on particular importance.  The present 
FDVH GRHV QRW FRQFHUQ WKH GLVVHPLQDWLRQ RI µLGHDV¶ EXW RI images 
FRQWDLQLQJ YHU\ SHUVRQDO RU HYHQ LQWLPDWH µLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ DERXW DQ
individual.¶18   
 
Later, in Rothe v Austria the ECtHR XSKHOG WKHQDWLRQDOFRXUW¶V ILQGLQJV WKDWDQH[SRVHRI 
homosexual activity in the Catholic church with accompanying photographs did not violate 
Article 8 because the story contributed to a debate of general interest.  It nonetheless held that 
the national courts did not sufficiently distinguish between the text and photographs in the 
report, and that the rights at stake should have been balanced separately, particularly as the 
publication of photographs was a more borderline issue.19  
 
In summary, a key principle guiding judicial treatment of photographs in Article 8 cases is that 
they are GLVWLQFW DQG VHSDUDEOH IRUPV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW DUH µVSHFLDO¶ DQG UDLVH profound 
privacy issues due to their intrusive nature.  Before considering the specific features of 
photographs that make them more intrusive than equivalent textual accounts in Part 3, it is 
necessary to examine the notion of µLQWUXVLRQ¶ itself.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) [2004] EMLR 21 [59]. Quoted in Douglas (n 15) [87].  This point was 
reiterated in Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) [2012] ECHR 40660/08.  See also: Rothe (n 7) [47]; Eerikainen 
& Others v Finland [2009] ECHR 3514/02 [70]; Egeland and Hanseid v Norway (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 2 [59].  
19
 Rothe (n 7) [73], [77] 
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[1] What is Intrusion? 
 
Though intrusion occupies a central role in the vocabulary of privacy discourse, it is a 
phenomenon that the law finds difficult to articulate, though leading academics have provided 
recent valuable doctrinal analyses.20  Taking an alternative approach, this part demonstrates 
KRZ µLQWUXVLRQ¶ RSHUDWHV DV D PHWDSKRU DFUoss privacy literature to represent a range of 
activities as WKHWUDQVJUHVVLRQRIDSURWHFWHGERXQGDULHGµLQQHU¶ 
 
7KHWHUPµLQWUXVLRQ¶RULJLQDWHGIURPWKH/DWLQZRUGVµWUXGHUH¶RUµWUXVXP¶WRWKUXVWDQGµLQ¶
(in) these essential meanings endure.  The Chambers Dictionary offers the following 
definitions: 
 
,QWUXGH µ(intransitive verb) to thrust oneself in; to enter uninvited or 
XQZHOFRPH«WRIRUFHLQ¶ 
,QWUXVLRQµ(noun) an act of intruding; encroachment.¶ 
,QWUXVLYHµ(adjective) tending or apt to intrude; intruded; inserted without 
etymological justification; entering without welcome or right¶21 
 
Across these meanings it is clear that intrusion entails some form of unwanted (uninvited, 
unwelcome, without justification) movement (entry, force in, insert, encroachment) to an inside 
(in).  Such an understanding necessarily entails two assumptions; first, that there is some form 
RIµRXWHU¶RURWKHUGLVWLQFWIURPWKHµLQQHU¶VHFRQG WKDW WKHUHLVVRPHIRUPRIERXQGDU\RU
border that iVWUDQVJUHVVHGLQWKHSURFHVVRIµPRYLQJ¶µLQ¶7KHVHIHDWXUHVRIµLQWUXVLRQ¶PDS
harmoniously onto physical activities that historically impacted upon individual privacy, e.g. 
trespass onto land or the home.  For example, in 6HPD\QH¶V&DVH (1604) the couUWVWDWHGµthe 
                                                          
20
 6HHHJ1LFROH0RUHKDP µ$&RQFHSWXDO)UDPHZRUN IRU WKH1HZ=HDODQG7RUWRI ,QWUXVLRQ¶
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 265-286.  Accessible via < 
https://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/research/publications/vuwlr/prev-issues/volume-47,-issue-2/Moreham-.pdf>; 
3DXO :UDJJ µ5HFRJQLVLQJ $ 3ULYDF\-Invasion Tort: The Conceptual Unity of Informational & Intrusion 
&ODLPV¶IRUWKFRPLQJ5HIHUHQFHTBC. 
21
 The Chambers Dictionary (Chambers, 10th ed, 2006) 783.  
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house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury 
DQGYLROHQFHDVIRUKLVUHSRVH¶; it set up the front door of a dwelling as a boundary that should 
not be crossed except in limited circumstances.22 
 
Across the latter half of the nineteenth century the intrusion-based terminology employed for 
physical land came to be applied to the physical person.  Warren & %UDQGHLV¶VHPLQDO
article made an important contribution to this development.  It called for the legal recognition 
of privacy rights, drawing upon select cases in copyright and confidence to argue that the 
underlying interest at stake was not property, but privacy.23  In presenting it as a free-standing 
LQWHUHVWWKH\µGLVHQWDQJOHG¶Srivacy from property.24  Yet, in the process, Warren & Brandeis 
nevertheless retained property-based terminology:  
 
µ7KH FRPPRQ ODZ KDV DOZD\V UHFRJQLVHG D PDQ¶V KRXVH DV KLV FDVWOH
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in execution of its 
commands.  Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted 
authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?¶25 
 
Similar use of property-based terminology is evident in Pavesich (1905), the first US case to 
explicitly recognise the right to privacy.  Here, the overlap between privacy and property rights 
in early common law was noted by Cobb J, who held that unauthorised use of a photograph of 
WKHSODLQWLIIIRUWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VQHZVSDSHUDGYHUWZDVµDWUHVSDVVXSRQKLVULJKWRISULYDF\¶26  
Cobb J quoted 6HPD\QH¶V &DVH DERYH DQG LQ OLJKW RI µQHZ FRQGLWLRQV¶ VXFK DV PRGHUQ
µLQVWDQWDQHRXVSKRWRJUDSK\¶DGYRFDWHGH[WHQGLQJVXFKOHJDOSULQFLSOHVWKDWSURWHFWHGSHUVRQV
IURPµDWWDFN¶27   
                                                          
22
 5 Co. Rep. 91, 91b. 
23
 6:DUUHQDQG/%UDQGHLVµ7KH5LJKWWR3ULYDF\¶YRO+DUYDUG/DZ5HYLHZ-220, 211, 205. 
24
 Post (n 11) 648. 
25
 Warren & Brandeis (n 23) 220. 
26
 Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co. et al (1905) Ga LEXIS 156, 222 (Cobb J).   
27
 ibid 197-198, 214-215. 
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It is arguably no coincidence that the first case to explicitly acknowledge a privacy right 
involved photography, or that the development of privacy doctrine broadly corresponded with 
the emergence of this new technology in the late nineteenth century.  During this time US 
courts dealt with a spate of disputes over photographic material,28  and indeed Warren & 
%UDQGHLVLGHQWLILHGµLQVWDQWDQHRXVSKRWRJUDSKV¶DVRQHRIWKHQHZWHFKQRORJLFDODGYDQFHVWKDW
posed a threat to privacy.29  9DULRXVFRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHDOVRQRWHGWKHHUD¶VJURZLQJFRQFHUQ
about WKHHIIHFWVRIXQPLWLJDWHGPDUNHWIRUFHVDQGWKHSHUFHLYHGULVNVRIFRPPRGLI\LQJRQH¶V
person. 30   The mass uptake of photography ± and particularly the activities of amateur 
photographers ± SURPSWHG ZLGHVSUHDG FHQVXUH ZLWK FULWLFV H[SUHVVLQJ µOXUNLQJ IHHOings of 
IDVFLQDWLRQ GLVFRPIRUW DQG DQ[LHW\ SURYRNHG E\ SKRWRJUDSK\¶31  Mensel cites this as one 
IDFWRU OHDGLQJ WR WKH HPHUJHQFH RI 1HZ <RUN¶V SULYDF\ ODZV DW WKH WXUQ RI WKH WZHQWLHWK
century.32  %DUEDVVLPLODUO\QRWHVWKHµYLVXDOUHYROXWLRQ¶initiated by cameras and other visual 
technologies.  Between 1880-1920 this combined with urbanisation, mass media and 
µDJJUHVVLYH *LOGHG $JH LQGLYLGXDOLVP¶ WR FUHDWH D FXOWXUDO VKLIW WKDW SODFHG HPSKDVLV RQ
successful self-presentation in public.33  Against this cultural backdrop, Barbas sees the privacy 
WRUWDVµthe legal manifestation of a nascent appearance-conscious, image-conscious culture¶34   
 
$VDUHVXOWRIWKHVHHDUO\GHYHORSPHQWVWKHWHUPµLQWUXVLRQ¶came to be employed more widely 
than the limited context of physical trespass onto land.  µIQWUXVLRQ¶ is now is used in privacy 
                                                          
28
 A useful overview of 19th C US photograph cases (and the influence of notions of property therein) is provided 
E\-RKQ5)LW]SDWULFNµ7KH8QDXWKRUL]HG3XEOLFDWLRQRI3KRWRJUDSKV¶*HRUJHWRZQ/DZ-RXUQDO
134. 
29
 µInstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life¶:DUUHQ	%UDQGHLV (n 23) 195-6.  See also 206. 
30
 (GZDUG%ORXVWHLQµ3ULYDF\DVDQ$VSHFWRI+XPDQ'LJQLW\$Q$QVZHUWR'HDQ3URVVHU¶YRO1HZ
York University Law Review 964, 988; Kahn (n 116DPDQWKD%DUEDVµ7KH/DZVRI,PDJH¶YRO
47 New England Law Review 23, 64. 
31
 5REHUW(0HQVHOµµ.RGDNHUV/\LQJLQ:DLW¶$PDWHXU3KRWRJUDSK\DQGWKH5LJKWRI3ULYDF\LQ1HZ<RUN
1885-¶YRO$PHULFDQ4XDUWHUO\-45, 29.  See also: 32, 33. 
32
 ibid 24-25. 
33
 Barbas (n 30) 28-38.  A similar cultural shift towards self-presentation is identified by Mensel, ibid 26. 
34
 Barbas (n 30) 26.  
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discourse in relation to a range of activities that engage privacy interests, including 
SKRWRJUDSK\:KHQXVHGLQWKLVZLGHUVHQVHµLQWUXVLRQ¶RSHUDWHVas a legal metaphor which 
has been rarely noted, though not subjected to further examination.35  7KHµLQWUXVLRQ¶PHWDSKRU
orients and structures our understanding of phenomena (e.g. being photographed without our 
knowledge) in more delineated and concrete ways (e.g. as a spatial transgression of a boundary).  
In doing so, it shapes or constructs our experience of reality.36  The intrusion metaphor, rooted 
LQSURSHUW\LVDQHQGXULQJLQIOXHQFHLQWKLVDUHD,QWKHSURFHVVRIµGLVHQWDQJOLQJ¶SULYDF\IURP
property, Warren & Brandeis ironically extended property-based terminology to the individual.  
The legacy of this development is that WKHPHWDSKRULFDO WUDQVJUHVVLRQIURPDQµLQQHU¶WRDQ
µRXWHU¶UHFXUVDFURVVDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUHRQSULYDF\LQYDULRXVIRUPV 
 
Hughes, for example, claims that mixed boundaries create privacy; it occurs when an 
LQGLYLGXDORUJURXSµsuccessfully employ barriers to obtain or maintain a state of privacy¶37  
These barriers can take three forms: first, physical (non-metaphorical) ones, such as walls and 
doors; second, behavioural barriers that communicate our wishes to others by words or actions, 
HJDVNLQJWREHOHIWDORQHRUSXWWLQJRQH¶VKDQGRYHUDFDPHUDOHQVWKLUGQRUPDWLYHEDUULHUV
e.g. social norms or laws that prohibit certain activities$FFRUGLQJWR+XJKHVµan invasion of 
SULYDF\RFFXUVZKHQSK\VLFDODQGEHKDYLRXUDOEDUULHUVDUHSHQHWUDWHG¶38 and access to the 
privacy seeker is obtained, though such transgressions are highly context-specific and may 
occur in different ways.  DescheemaeNHU¶V DQDO\VLV RI SULYDF\ KDUPV DOVR XWLOLVHV WKH
transgression of boundaries.  He identifies three categories of harm that may arise when privacy 
                                                          
35
 -DPHV:KLWPDQµ7ZR:HVWHUQ&XOWXUHVRI3ULYDF\'LJQLW\9HUVXV/LEHUW\¶YRO<DOHLaw Journal 
6HHDOVR-RQDWKDQ.DKQµ3ULYDF\DVD/HJDO3ULQFLSOHRI,GHQWLW\0DLQWHQDQFH¶6HWRQ
Hall L Rev 371, 379, 393, 383, 394. 
36
 I have examined the effects of metaphors, such as rights-EDODQFLQJLQSULYDF\ODZHOVHZKHUHµA Just Balance 
RU-XVW,PEDODQFH"7KH5ROHRI0HWDSKRULQ0LVXVHRI3ULYDWH,QIRUPDWLRQ¶ [2015] Journal of Media Law, Vol 
7(2), 196-224, 208-210, 213.  
37
 .LUVW\+XJKHVµ$%HKDYLRXUDO8QGHUVWDQGLQJRI3ULYDF\DQGLWV,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU3ULYDF\/DZ¶) 
MLR 806-836, 807. 
38
 ibid 812, 814.  
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is breached: financial loss, mental harm (both of which involve concrete, discernible harms) or 
loss of privacy per se (where violation of the right is the loss, albeit an abstract one).39  He cites 
Gulati as an example of the law recognising the latter.  Here the court awarded damages to 
claimants whose phones had been hacked by the News of the World despite the fact they had 
been unaware of the intrusion.40  This approach sees the violation of a right as wrong in itself, 
irrespective of other concrete losses that might flow from it.  In this context, Descheemaeker 
FODLPV ULJKWV VXFK DV SULYDF\ µform a sphere of protection around the plaintiff¶ WR SURWHFW
FHUWDLQ VRFLDO JRRGV RU LQWHUHVWV  :KHUH µHis interests have been invaded « WKDW is the 
detriment, harm or loss that he has suffered¶DQGWKHULJKWPXVWEHUHVWRUHG41  In doing so, 
Descheemaeker extends spatial tHUPLQRORJ\VXFKDVµLQYDVLRQV¶RIµVSKHUHV¶WRabstract rights.   
 
Elsewhere, at doctrinal level, there is emerging academic consensus that the English common 
law should develop to recognise intrusion as a legal wrong in itself, as in New Zealand and the 
US.42   Moreham advocates an intrusion tort distinct from information-misuse, conceiving 
µLQWUXVLRQ¶LQSK\VLFDOWHUPVDVµXQZDQWHGDFFHVVWRRQH¶VSK\VLFDOVHOI¶ This would cover 
intrusion into physical privacy by watching, listening and/or recording an individual when they 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy; such activities violate dignity, autonomy and cause 
real emotional harm in themselves, irrespective of what might be done with any information 
obtained as a result.43  ,PSOLFLWLQ0RUHKDP¶VGHILQLWLRQLVWKDWWRREWDLQSK\VLFDODFFHVVWRDQ
individual against their wishes, the intruder must cross either physical or metaphorical (e.g. 
behavioural) barriers.  These select examples show sophisticated, technical uses of the 
µLQWUXVLRQ¶PHWDSKRUEXWDQDOWHUQDWLYHXVHRIWKis metaphor in privacy discourse is particularly 
                                                          
39
 (ULF'HVFKHHPDHNHUµ7KH+DUPVRI3ULYDF\¶-RXUQDORI0HGLD/DZ'HVFKHHPDHNHU
claims that harms to dignity can be understood within his 2nd and 3rd categories: 284-285. 
40
 Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 [168] 
41
 Descheemaeker (n 39) 279, 288, 289-290. 
42
 1LFROH0RUHKDPµ%H\RQG,QIRUPDWLRQ3K\VLFDO3ULYDF\LQ(QJOLVK/DZ¶&DPEULGJH/DZ-RXUQDO
350-377; Wragg (n 20). 
43
 Moreham (n 42) 352-355.  See also: Moreham (n 20) 4-5, 10-11, 16. 
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pertinent to photography; the notion of a transgression into a person¶VµVSLULWXDO¶LQWHULRU7KLV
intriguing and important example thus warrants further attention. 
 
The µ6SLULW¶	7KH,QWUXVLRQ0HWDSKRU 
 
Reflecting the more fundamental mind/body dualism, the intrusion metaphor is also employed 
in privacy literature WRUHSUHVHQWWKHFURVVLQJRIDERXQGDU\LQWRDSHUVRQ¶VµLQQHU¶OLIHWKRXJK
WKLV µLQQHU¶DVSHFW LV DUWLFXODWHG LQvarious ways.  Select liberal theorists draw a distinction 
EHWZHHQWKHµRXWHU¶VHOISUHVHQWHGWRWKHZRUOGDQGRQH¶VµLQQHU¶OLIHRUIHHOLQJV which privacy 
is ultimately concerned with protecting. 44   For example, Nagel explores the boundaries 
between what individuals conceal and expose publicly.  He argues concealment is an important 
aspect of civilization, and a degree of control over what we reveal is crucial.45  In doing so, he 
VHHVWKHSXEOLFµVHOI¶DVDVRUWRIVKLHOGVRWKDWWKHLQQHUOLIHFDQEHIUHHDQGSURWHFWHGµfrom the 
crippling effects of the external gaze¶46  Elsewhere, Simmel claimed that a private sphere of 
unknowability surrounds HYHU\KXPDQKLVZULWLQJLVUHSOHWHZLWKUHIHUHQFHVWRDµVSKHUH¶RU
µERXQGDU\¶WKDWZHFDQQRWµFURVV¶µLQYDGH¶RUµSHQHWUDWHZLWKRXWGLVWXUELQJWKHSHUVRQDOYDOXH
RIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶47  6LPPHO¶VDUJXPHQWLVEDVHGRQWKHQRWLRQWKDWRXUERG\LVRXUµSURSHUW\¶
DQGWKXVµevery invasion of this possession is resented as a violation of the personality; so that 
there is a spiritual private property, to invade which signifies violation of the ego at its 
centre.¶48  Bloustein similarly claims that though legal vocaEXODU\ LV µH[FHHGLQJO\ OLPLWHG¶
SULYDF\GHDOVZLWKµin some sense a spiritual interest¶49 
 
                                                          
44
 Commentators on intrusional privacy law agree that it is concerned with addressing harms, including harm to 
feelings, emotional harm and mental distress: Wragg (n 20); Moreham (20) 10-11. 
45
 7KRPDV1DJHOµ&RQFHDOPHQW	 ([SRVXUH¶3KLORVRSK\	3XEOLF$IIDLUV-30, 4. 
46
 ibid 17. 
47
 *HRUJ6LPPHO µ7KH6RFLRORJ\RI6HFUHF\	6HFUHW6RFLHWLHV¶$PHULFDQ-RXUQDORI6RFLRORJ\9RO
(1906) 441-498, 453-4. 
48
 Emphasis added.  ibid 7KHQODWHUµ7KHULJKWRIWKDWVSLULWXDOSULYDWHSURSHUW\¶ 
49
 Emphasis added.  Bloustein (n 30) 1002. 
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&RQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHYLHZWKDWSULYDF\ODZVDUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKDVSLULWXDOµLQQHUOLIH¶ZHHYHQ
VHHH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHµVRXO¶ e.g. in the work of Marx50 and Shils,51 and, on occasion, 
case law.52  7KHLGHDRIµWKHVRXO¶is tied to the Judeo-Christian view of the sanctity of life, a 
µUHOLJLRQLVW¶HWKRV which KROGV WKDW µHuman life is divinely valued and valuable; we are all 
sacred.  We all have the spark of the divine.¶53  This ancient, religious reverence for the soul-
bearing person was a background influence at the very outset of the emergence of privacy 
GLVFRXUVHLQWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\:DUUHQ	%UDQGHLV¶VSULPDU\FRQFHUQIRUµPDQ¶VVSLULWXDO
QDWXUH¶54 DQG µLQYLRODWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶55  including thoughts, feelings and intellect, is widely 
QRWHG(OVHZKHUHWKH\ODPHQWLQYDVLRQVRIWKHµVDFUHGSUHFLQFWV¶RISULYDWHOLIH56  In doing so, 
the authors were also arguably articulating subtle cultural shifts in the late Victorian American 
bourgeoise UHJDUGLQJ µWKH HQKDQFHG UROH RI IHHOLQJ HPRWLRQ RU VHQWLPHQW DV DVSHFWV RI
VHOIKRRG¶ DQG D µIDVFLQDWLRQ ZLWK LQQHU IHHOLQJ¶ 57   Furthermore, they were also arguably 
seeking to protect this inviolate personality from rapidly expanding market forces.  Kahn writes: 
 
µIn a world where everything was being turned into a commodity, champions 
of privacy felt a pressing need to identify and protect the non-fungible 
µVSLULWXDO QDWXUH¶ RI PDQ  µ,GHQWLW\¶ LQ SDUWLFXODU ZDV increasingly 
becoming subject to commodification¶58 
 
                                                          
50
 µ6XUYHLOODQFHDEXVH«FDQEHVHHQDVDQDVVDXOWRQWKHVRXO± the very essence of the self beyond the tangible.¶
Gary T Marx, Windows into the Soul, Surveillance and Society in an Age of Technology (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2016) 318; 319. 
51
 µ7KHµVRFLDOVSDFH¶DURXQGDQLQGLYLGXDOWKHUHFROOHFWLRQRIKLVSDVWKLVFRQYHUVDWLRQKLVERG\DQGLWVLPDJH
DOOEHORQJ WRKLP«+HSRVVHVVHV WKHPDQG LVHQWLWOHG WRSRVVHVs them by virtue of the charisma which is 
inherent in his existence as an individual soul ± as we say nowadays, in his individuality¶ (GZDUG6KLOV
µ3ULYDF\,WV&RQVWLWXWLRQ	9LFLVVLWXGHV¶/DZ	&RQWHPS3UREV 
52
 See e.g. X County Council v C [2007] EWHC 1771 (Fam) [38] (Munby J); R (Johns) v Derby City Council & 
Anor [2011] EWHC 375 (Admin) [97] (Munby LJ).  These examples are offered by Jill Marshall, Human 
Rights Law & Personal Identity (Routledge, Oxon, 2014).  See also: Onassis v Christian Dior 122 Misc.2d 603 
(1984).  In this US image rights dispute, the court stated that the relevant 1HZ<RUNVWDWXWH µis intended to 
protect the essence of a person, his or her identity or persona from being unwittingly or unknowingly 
misappropriated for the profit of another.¶(PSKDVLVDGGHG 
53
 1JDLUH1DIILQH /DZ¶V0HDQLQJRI /LIH3KLORVRSK\5HOLJLRQ'DUZLQ 	7KH/HJDO3HUVRQ 2[IRUG+DUW
2009) 23, 25.  See also: chapter 7. 
54
 Warren & Brandeis (n 23) 193. 
55
 ibid 211, 205. 
56
 ibid 195. 
57
 Mensel (n 31) 24, 26.  See also: 40. 
58
 Emphasis added.  Kahn (n 11) 221, 222. 
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Traces of a spiritual or sacred aspect to being human continue in modern secular, privacy 
GLVFRXUVHLQWKHIRUPRIGLJQLW\WKHQRWLRQWKDWµHDFKKXPDQEHLQJSRVVHVVHVDQLQWULQVLFZRUWK
that should be reVSHFWHG¶59  0F&UXGGHQ¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH FRQFHSW¶V history shows that its 
development involved a combination of religious and non-religious influences, e.g. from 
Roman law and later Kant.60  1DIILQHH[SODLQVWKDWWKHµUHOLJLRQLVW¶YHQHUDWLRQRIWKHVDQFWLW\
oIKXPDQOLIHµis sometimes expressed as innate or inherent dignity or human inviolability, but 
the message is largely the same¶61  In this sense, dignity can be seen as representing an 
DOWHUQDWLYHPHDQVRIH[SUHVVLQJFRQFHUQIRUWKHKXPDQµVSLULW¶RUµVRXO¶DOEHLWRQHWKDWLVQRW
necessarily reliant on religious faith.  Indeed, 0DUVKDOOFODLPVWKDWGLJQLW\LVµWKHPRGHUQGD\
VXFFHVVRUWRWKHVRXO¶62 and that  
 
µ7KLV VRXOLVK VHOI LV RIWHQ SUHVHQWHG DV D XQLWDU\ ZKROH DSSDUHQWO\
unchanging core or essence of who we are. Notions of the soul, as the core 
RIRXUHVVHQFHUHPDLQVWURQJLQKXPDQULJKWVODZ¶63 
 
2QH OLNHO\ UHDVRQ IRU WKLV LQIOXHQFH LV GLJQLW\¶V FUXFLDO IRXQGDWLRQDO UROH LQ WKHGUDIWLQJRI
international human rights (IHR) treaties in the post-WWII era.  Dignity was adopted as a basis 
for human rights; its utility was that it enabled parties of very different religions and political 
stances to agree the texts of IHR treaties whilst holding different understandings of what 
µGLJQLW\¶PHDQWµEveryone could agree that human dignity was central, but not why or how.¶64  
                                                          
59
 &KULVWRSKHU0F&UXGGHQ µ+XPDQ'LJQLW\	-XGLFLDO,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶(-,/
655- 6HH DOVR&KDUOHV5%HLW] µ+XPDQ'LJQLty in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing But a 
3KUDVH"¶YRO3KLORVRSK\	3XEOLF$IIDLUV-290, especially 272. 
60
 A good overview of the history of dignity is set out at: McCrudden (n 59) 656-663. 
61
 Naffine (n 53) 102. 
62
 References include: µA modern day successor to the soul¶FKDSWHUµThis is the modern successor to the soul¶
FRQFOXVLRQµThe concept of the self has been described [by Martin and Barresi]  as a replacement for the soul 
and the contemporary descendent of the soul¶FKDSWHU 3.  Marshall (n 52). 
63
 ibid chapter 3 
64
 McCrudden (n 59$OVR7KRXJK0F&UXGGHQGRHVFODLPWKDWDµbasic minimum content of 
the meaning of dignity can be discerned: that each human being possesses an intrinsic worth that should be 
respected, that some forms of conduct are inconsistent with respect for this intrinsic worth, and that the state 
exists for the individual not vice versa.¶ 
15 
 
'LJQLW\WKXVVXSSODQWHGµ*RG¶RUµQDWXUH¶DVWKHEDVLVRIULJKWV65  But one crucial consequence 
RIGLJQLW\¶VHQKDQFHGUROHZDVDFFRUGLQJWR1DIILQHDµfortification of the tendency among 
lawyers to ascribe inherent (and necessarily pre-legal) spiritual value to human beings¶66  
 
Privacy and dignity are closely entwined, and the courts have acknowledged that dignity 
underlies Article 8 in cases such as Campbell,67 PJS,68 Mosley,69 Richard70 and particularly 
Gulati.71  Dignity also forms the basis of numerous academic accounts of privacy.  For example, 
it occupies a central role in the work of Bloustein, who sees dignity and the inviolate personality 
as intrinsically connected, claiming  
 
µI taNH WKH SULQFLSOH RI µLQYLRODWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ WR SRVLW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
LQGHSHQGHQFHGLJQLW\DQGLQWHJULW\LWGHILQHVPDQ¶Vessence as a unique and 
self-determining being.¶72 
 
)RU %ORXVWHLQ LQVWDQFHV RI LQWUXVLRQ VSHFLILFDOO\ XQGHUPLQH RQH¶V GLJQLW\ µDVVDXOW¶ RQH¶V
personality and treat one as less than a person.73  Fried provides another prominent example, 
arguing in Kantian terms that everyone is equally entitled to the basic privacy right simply 
because they are persons and therefore ends in themselves.74  Elsewhere, Whitman notes the 
great influence of dignity in European understandings of privacy.75  So in an influential strand 
of privacy literature the intrusion metaphor manifests DVDVSLULWXDOµLQQHU¶VHOIWKDWZDUUDQWV
protection from invasion.  As well as QXPHURXVH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHVWRµVSLULWV¶DQd µVRXOV¶, the 
                                                          
65
 )UDQFHVFD.OXJµ7KH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW± $µ7KLUG:D\¶RUµ7KLUG:DYH¶%LOORI5LJKWV¶>@(4) E.H.R.L.R. 
361, 365. 
66
 Naffine (n 53) 102.  See also: 105. 
67
 Campbell (n 14) [50]-[51] (Lord Hoffmann).  Quoted in Ali v Channel 5 (n 17) [148] 
68
 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 393 [34].  
69
 Mosley (n 15) [7], [214]-[216] 
70
 Sir Cliff Richard v BBC & Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2018] EWHC 1837 [350], [352]. 
71
 Gulati (n 40) [110]-[111], [168]-[169] 
72
 Emphasis added.  Bloustein (n 30) 971. See also: 994, 995. 
73
 ibid 973, 974.  See also: 1000. 
74
 &KDUOHV)ULHGµ3ULYDF\¶YRO<DOH/DZ-RXUQDO 
75
 Whitman (n 35) 1151. 
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IRXQGDWLRQDOFRQFHSWRIµGLJQLW\¶DFWVDVDIORDWLQJVLJQLILHUWKDW can embrace both secular and 
religious possibilities, as well as connotations of WKHµsoul¶spirit and innate human value.  
 
Summary 
 
7KLVSDUWKDVHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWµLQWUXVLRQ¶WKHWUDQVJUHVVLRQRIDERXQGDU\LQWRDQLQQHUKDVLWV
origins in physical property but came to be extended to the person with the emergence of 
privacy laws and discourse in the late nineteenth century.  This development was at least partly 
in response to anxieties raised by the mass spread of photography.  Intrusion now functions as 
a legal metaphor that structures our experiences and understandings of privacy.  In particular, 
this metaphor plays an important role in constructing a binary between an outer self presented 
to the world and DµVSLULWXDO¶LQterior that privacy purports to protect from transgression.  This 
LQQHU µHVVHQFH¶ D µGHHSHU¶ XQLTXH µWUXH VHOI¶, may be expressed as a soul, spirit, inviolate 
personality or innate human dignity.  But across these various accounts emerges an incorporeal, 
amorphous, almost mysterious, precious µLQQHU¶ OLIH.  It pertains to the emotional, though it 
cannot be reduced to this and case law clearly indicates that emotional harm is not necessary 
for an Art 8 infringement.76  As the remainder of this article demonstrates, this manifestation 
of the intrusion metaphor is pertinent to photography as it informs judicial approaches to the 
medium, particularly at ECtHR level.  
 
[2] Article 8: Personality, Image & Capture  
 
Article 8 protection for the subjects of photographs is based upon the need to foster the 
personality development.  This is influenced by the continental personality right which, as this 
                                                          
76
 Murray v Express Newspapers [2008] EWCA Civ 446 [16]-[17]; Gulati (n 40) [137], [143]; Weller v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 [196]. 
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part argues, shares many features with the spiritual intrusion metaphor.  But this part also 
identifies an apparent divergence in English courts where such personality notions are less 
influential, particularly in judicial approaches to photographic capture. 
 
[2.1] From Privacy to Personality? 
 
7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW IRU $UWLFOH ¶V FDSDFLW\ WR potentially protect an individual vis-a-vis 
SKRWRJUDSK\LVLWVFRQFHUQIRUµSHUVRQDOLW\¶7KH(&W+5KDVVWDWHGWKDW$UWicle 8 includes a 
SHUVRQ¶VµSK\VLFDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDOLQWHJULW\¶77 and that it LVµprimarily intended to ensure 
the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his 
relations with other human beings¶78   The introduction of this terminology is significant 
EHFDXVHWKHULJKWWRGHYHORSRQH¶VSHUVRQDOLW\ZDVRULJLQDOO\H[SOLFLWO\RPLWWHGIURP the ECHR 
text.79  Furthermore, it lends support to claims that the ECtHR has transformed Article 8 into a 
European civil law-VW\OH µSHUVRQDOLW\ ULJKW¶ ZKLFK Hntails a positive, broader framing, in 
contrast with the traditional negative, narrower 86DFFRXQWRISULYDF\DVPHUHO\WKHµULJKWWR
EHOHWDORQH¶.80   
 
7KH FRQFHSW RI µSHUVRQDOLW\¶ KDV LWV RULJLQV LQ WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH
philosophies of Kant and Hegel whose ideas were utilised by German legal scholars in the late 
                                                          
77
 See also: A v Norway [2009] ECHR 28070/06 [63].  
78
 Pfeiffer v Austria (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 8 [33].  See also: X v Iceland (1976) 6825/74; Pretty v United Kingdom 
[2002] ECHR 2346/02 [61]; Bensaid v United Kingdom (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 10 [47]; Varapnickaite-Mazyliene 
v Lithuania (2008) 20376/05 [43]. 
79
 %DUWYDQGHU6ORRWµ3ULYDF\DV3HUVRQDOLW\5LJKW:K\WKH(&W+5¶V)RFXVRQ8OWHULRU,QWHUHVWV0LJKW3URYH
,QGLVSHQVLEOHLQWKH$JHRIµ%LJ'DWD¶8WUHFKW-RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG(XURSHDQ/DZ
28. 
80
 ibid 44.   
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QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WRFUHDWHDQHZOHJDOFDWHJRU\µpersonlichkeit¶81  The concept involves the 
free development of personality82 by the exercise of free will or autonomy.  In :KLWPDQ¶VWHUPV 
 
µthe defining characteristic of creatures with free will was that they were 
unpredictably individual, creatures whom no science of mechanics or 
ELRORJ\FRXOGHYHUFDSWXUHLQWKHLUULFKQHVV«WKHSXUSRVHRIµIUHHGRP¶ZDV
to allow each individual to fully realise his potential as an individual: to give 
full expression to his peculiar capacities and powers¶83   
 
7KLVHQWDLOHGµGHHSHUDQGPRUHFRPSOH[¶QRWLRQRIIUHHGRPWKDQQHJDWLYHOLEHUW\EHFDXVHWKH
IXOOGHYHORSPHQWRIRQH¶VSHUVRQDOLW\QHFHVVLWDWHGVRFLDOHQJDJHPHQWQRWVLPSO\VHFOXVLRQ84  
Nonetheless, the German-based personality right shares four related common features with the 
privacy literature discussed in Part 1.  First, it is intrinsically linked to dignity, the central value 
of the German constitution as influenced by Christian natural law, secular theories of autonomy 
and especially Kant.85  Second, due to its basis in dignity, the personality right is explicitly 
FRQFHUQHGZLWKPDWWHUVRIWKHKXPDQVSLULWKXPDQVDUHFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµVSLULWXDO-PRUDOEHLQJV¶
ZLWKDQµLQWHOOHFWXDODQGVSLULWXDOLGHQWLW\DQGLQWHJULW\¶86  Third, German personality discourse 
also relies heavily on boundary metaphors, particularly in relation to this inner-oriented 
spiritual-PRUDOµFRUH¶RUµ,QQHU6SDFH¶Innenraum), though there is no clear divide between 
LQQHUDQGRXWHUDVSHFWVµERWKDUHFRPSRQHQWVRIDQLQWHJUDWHGZKROHSHUVRQ¶87  Finally, the 
personality right also represents a safeguard against the commodification of individuals.88  As 
:KLWPDQKDVVKRZQWKHVH*HUPDQLGHDVZHUHDQLPSRUWDQWLQIOXHQFHRQ:DUUHQ	%UDQGHLV¶
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  6HH DOVR *LRUJLR 5HVWD µ3HUVRQQDOLWH 3HUVRQOLFKNHLW 3HUVRQDOLW\¶ 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  (XURSHDQ -RXUQDO RI
Comparative Law & Governance, 215, 228-235. 
82
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83
 Whitman (n 35) 1181. 
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 (GZDUG(EHUOHµ+XPDQ'LJQLW\3ULYDF\DQG3HUVRQDOLW\LQ*HUPDQDQG$PHULFDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO/DZ¶
vol 4 Utah Law Review 963, 971-973. 
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 ibid 973, 975, 982 
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 ibid 980-1RWHWHUPLQRORJ\OLNHVSKHUHEDUULFDGHSHQHWUDWH6HHDOVRDFFRXQWRIWKHDEDQGRQHGµ6SKHUH
7KHRU\¶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DGYRFDF\RIWKHµLQYLRODWHSHUVRQDOLW\¶ HYHQLIWKHLUDWWHPSWHGµFRQWLQHQWDOWUDQVSODQW¶WR86
law proved ultimately unsuccessful.89 
 
Yet RQHFUXFLDOGLIIHUHQFHLVWKHVHFRQGDGGLWLRQDOµRXWZDUG¶-facing, communal aspect of the 
personality right.90  ,WVµIRFXV«RQWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKHLQGLYLGXDOWo develop his identity, create 
his persona and flourish as a unique individual¶OHDGVLWWRencompass a bundle of rights that 
foster self-determination, self-development and self-presentation.91  Thus personality rights 
recognise the possibility of a more FRPSOH[UHFLSURFDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµRXWHU¶DQGµLQQHU¶
aspects of personhood; this nuance is also present in the work of select privacy academics,92 
most notably Goffman.   
 
*RIIPDQ¶VLQIOXHQWLDOZRUNDOVRHQWDLOVGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQDQLQQHUDQGRXWer, albeit in a more 
VRSKLVWLFDWHGIRUP,Q*RIIPDQ¶VZRUNRQµIDFH¶DIRUPRISRVLWLYHLGHQWLW\RUUHSXWDWLRQLV
generated via social interactions.93  Goffman writes that: 
 
µface clearly is something that is not lodged in or on >RQH¶V@ body, but rather 
something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter and 
becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted¶94 
 
In this sense, self-LPDJHGHSHQGVXSRQWKHFRQGXFWDQGYLHZVRIRWKHUSHRSOHLWLVµon loan to 
[one] from society¶95  *RIIPDQ¶VZRUNWKXVHQWDLOVWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOµVHOI¶
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 Whitman (n 35) 1203-1208. 
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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2¶&DOODJKDQ (n 84) 44-46. 
91
  van der Sloot (n 79) 25, 26, 27, 44.  See also: Resta (n 81) 238; Whitman (n 35) 1161.  
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(which may seek to claim privacy) is not a singular, discrete unit, but instead a creation of 
social interactions.96  For Goffman, despite appearances, the self does not solely or even 
primarily emanate from WKHLQGLYLGXDO,QVWHDGWKHVHOIDULVHVYLDDSURFHVVRIµMRLQWFHUHPRQLDO
ODERU¶ ZLWK RWKHUV97 i.e. from the outside-in, as transient, shifting and multiple selves are 
projected onto the individual: 
 
µ,QDQDO\VLQJWKHVHOIWKHQZHDUHGUDZQDZD\IURPLWVSRVVHVVRU«IRUKH
and his body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative 
manufacture will be hung for a time.  And the means for producing and 
mDLQWDLQLQJ VHOYHV GR QRW UHVLGH LQVLGH WKH SHJ¶ « %XW ZHOO RLOHG
impressions will flow from it fast enough to put us in the grip of one of our 
types of reality ± the performance will come off and the firm self accorded 
each performed character will appear to emanate intrinsically from its 
performer¶98 
 
<HWGHVSLWHLWVVFHSWLFLVPRIDFRQFUHWHXQLWDU\FRKHUHQWVHOI*RIIPDQ¶VDQDO\VLVVWLOOUHVWVRQ
D EURDG GLFKRWRP\ EHWZHHQ µIDFH¶ WKH FRQVWUXFWHG LGHQWLW\ FUHDWHG E\ RWKHU SHRSOHV¶
interpretations of the behaviour and information one presents to the world, and something else 
behind or within it.  For example, Goffman states that personal and social identities can be 
µFRQWUDVWHGZLWKWKHµHJR¶RUµIHOW¶LGHQWLW\QDPHO\WKHVXEMHFWLYHVHQVHRI>RQH¶V@ own situation 
and >RQH¶V@ own continuity and character that an individual comes to obtain as a result of 
>RQH¶V@ various social experiences.¶ 99   Elsewhere, Goffman acknowledges a distinction 
EHWZHHQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V RXWHU µIDFH¶ DQG KLV LQQHU µIHOW LGHQWLW\¶ whilst simultaneously 
QRWLQJWKDWWKHµIDFH¶FRPHVWRIRUPSDUWRIRQH¶VµIHOWLGHQWLW\¶ 
 
                                                          
96
 µA correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this 
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µWKH ZRUG SHUVRQ LQ ILUVW PHDQLQJ LV D PDVN « LQVRIDU DV WKLV PDVN
represents the conception we have formed of ourselves ± the role we are 
striving to live up to ± this mask is our truer self, the self we would like to 
be.  In the end, our conception of our role becomes second nature and an 
integral part of our personality.¶100 
 
Though Goffman does not explicitly deal with intrusion, his work provides insights that are 
highly pertinent to privacy and intrusion, particularly in the context of photographs.  His work 
RIIHUVDVRSKLVWLFDWHGDFFRXQWRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQRXWHUµIDFH¶DQGLQQHUµIHOWLGHQWLW\¶ 
Both continental personality theory and Goffman emphasise the importance of social outward-
facing aspects of selfhood.  %RWKVKRZKRZWKHVHµRXWHU¶HOHPHQWVSURIRXQGO\LPSDFWXSRQ
RQH¶V LQQHU µVSLULW¶RU µIHOW LGHQWLW\¶DOEHLW Ln different ways.  Personality theory assumes a 
XQLILHGDXWRQRPRXVFRUHµLQQHU¶WKDWVHHNVWRH[SUHVVLWVHOILQWKHZRUOGLQRUGHUWRIORXULVK
*RIIPDQVXJJHVWVDQHYHQFORVHU UHODWLRQEHWZHHQRXWHU µIDFH¶DQG LQQHU µIHOW LGHQWLW\¶  In 
particular, it reverses narrow OLEHUDO DVVXPSWLRQV WKDW WKH VHOI RULJLQDWHV IURP µZLWKLQ¶ WKH
individual, and helps us see that external social inputs play a crucial role not only in 
GHWHUPLQLQJRQH¶VRXWHU µIDFH¶EXW LQ WKHSURFHVVDOVRFRQVWLWXWHDQLPSRUWDQWSDUWRIRQH¶V
µLQQHU¶VHOIRUVHOYHV  In this sense, both theories lend potential support for the proposition that 
if Art 8 is concerned with protecting a dignitary, spiritual inner life, then it should provide some 
form of protection, where appropriate, for µRXWZDUG¶-facing activities involving self-
SUHVHQWDWLRQDQGVRFLDOHQJDJHPHQW7KH(&W+5¶VFRQWLQHQWDO-influenced interpretation of Art 
8 as primarily intended to foster personality development provides such recognition. 
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[2.2] Image and Photographic Capture 
 
Its personality rights-influenced approach has led the ECtHR to repeatedly confirm that Article 
LQFOXGHVDULJKWWRRQH¶VYLVXDOLPDJH101 RQRFFDVLRQFDWHJRULVLQJLWDVDQDVSHFWRIµSHUVRQDO
identity¶.102  7KRXJKDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VµLPDJH¶PD\EHXQGHUVWRRGWRFRYHUDUDQJHRIDWWULEXWHV
LQWKHLUWKHSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQDNLQWR*RIIPDQ¶VµIDFH¶WKH(&W+5¶VXVHRIWKHWHUPUHIHUV
VSHFLILFDOO\WRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSK\VLFDODSSHDUDQFHDVFDSWXUHGE\SKRWRJUDSKV  In Reklos the 
ECtHR stated 
 
µA SHUVRQ¶V image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her 
personality DV LW UHYHDOV WKH SHUVRQ¶V XQLTXH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG
GLVWLQJXLVKHV WKH SHUVRQ IURP KLV SHHUV  7KH ULJKW RI SURWHFWLRQ RI RQH¶V
image is thus one of the essential components of personal development and 
presupposes the right to control the use of that image.¶103   
 
6R RQH¶V YLVXDO LPDJH LV UHOHYDQW LQ SULYDF\ WHUPV EHFDXVH LW LV D IDFHW LQGHHG D primary 
attribute, of the personality that Art 8 iVFRQFHUQHGZLWKSURWHFWLQJ7KLVDVVXPHVWKDWRQH¶V
physical appearance reveals or expresses something about RQH¶Vpersonality; that there is some 
VRUWRILQKHUHQWOLQNEHWZHHQWKHWZR.DKQ¶VFRPPHQWWKDWWKHPavesich MXGJPHQWµDVVXPHV
a very special rHODWLRQEHWZHHQRQH¶VLPDJHDQGRQH¶VVHOI¶DQGVHHVLPDJHDVDQµH[WHUQDO
PDQLIHVWDWLRQ¶RISHUVRQDOLW\104 is equally applicable here.   
 
But English caselaw sets out a more qualified position on image than the Reklos passage above.  
In the pre-Reklos Campbell Baroness Hale stated that English Law µ[does]  not recognise a 
                                                          
101
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ULJKW WR RQH
V RZQ LPDJH « 7KH activity photographed must be private¶ 105   This broad 
approach has been applied in subsequent cases, e.g. John106 and Ferdinand,107 where claimants 
unsuccessfully argued that photographs violated their Art 8 right.  Yet the Reklos passage above 
has nevertheless been quoted in Weller108 and by the partially dissenting Lords Kerr and Wilson 
in JR38.109  So it seems there is a potential divergence between the ECtHR and English courts, 
as highlighted by their respective approaches to photographic capture.   
 
A Divergence Regarding Photographic Capture? 
3KRWRJUDSKVIL[RUFDSWXUHDPRPHQW,Q%HUJHU¶VWHUPVDSKRWRJUDSKµisolates, preserves and 
presents a moment taken from a continuum¶110  Most of the Article 8 cases discussed here 
involve disputes over the publication of photographs (to be discussed further in Part 3) rather 
than the initial capture of the shot.  TKHLQLWLDOUHFRUGLQJRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLPDJHLVDIIRUGHd 
relatively little attention in case law.  The marginalisation of capture is epitomised by Lord 
+RIIPDQQ¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ LQ Campbell between the mere taking of a photograph and its 
publication, and his claim that in contemporary society people may be photographed without 
their permission, but this is not an invasion of privacy per se;111 this influential rationale runs 
through various cases.112  
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(Bloomsbury 2009) 54-55; Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (Routledge, 2001) 204; Barthes (n 4) 4. 
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TKH(&W+5¶VSHUVRQDOLW\-based approach holds that Article 8 may be engaged by the basic act 
of taking a photograph.  In Reklos the ECtHR FODLPHGWKDWWKHULJKWWRFRQWURORQH¶VLPDJHPD\
HQDEOHWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIDSKRWRJUDSKWREHSUHYHQWHG   %XWFUXFLDOO\µit also covers the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWRREMHFWWRWKHUHFRUGLQJFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGUHSURGXFWLRQRIWKHLPDJHEy 
another person¶  5HMHFWLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DUJXPHQWV WKDW $UWLFOH  ZDV QRW HQJDJHG
because the photograph remained unpublished, the ECtHR indicated that the capture was 
significant per se because  
 
µan essential attribute of personality would be retained in the hands of 
a third party and the person concerned would have no control over any 
subsequent use of the image¶113   
 
7KH(&W+5¶VMXGJPHQWPXVWEHseen in light of the particular facts of the case, which involved 
a photograph of a new born baby taken on a baby unit without parental permission.  The court 
qualified its judgment by distinguishing these facts from a situation where an individual lays 
themselves open to the possibility of having their photograph taken.114  Nevertheless, the 
rationale in Reklos is potentially important because it seems to accept the potential privacy 
LPSOLFDWLRQVRIWDNLQJDSHUVRQ¶VSKRWRgraph DQGLWVHWVRXWDEDVLFULJKWWRFRQWURORQH¶VLPDJH
in principle.  Examples from other jurisdictions illustrate this rationale in practice.  In the 
German case of Urteil the Bundesgerichtshof ordered a man who had intimate photographs of 
his ex-partner to delete them, despite his claims that he did not intend to disseminate them.115  
But the Canadian Supreme Court judgment in Aubry (1998) encapsulates this rationale at its 
strongest.  Finding in favour of a young claimant who objected to the magazine publication of 
a photograph of her sitting on town hall steps, it claimed:   
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µ[F]eeling is likely to be offended each time a photographer invades 
VRPHRQH¶VSULYDF\or serves it up to the public.  The camera lens captures a 
KXPDQPRPHQWDWLWVPRVWLQWHQVHDQGWKHVQDSVKRWµGHILOHV¶WKDWPRPHQW
The privileged instant of personal life becomHVµWKLVREMHFWLPDJHoffered to 
WKHFXULRVLW\RIWKHJUHDWHVWQXPEHU¶$SHUVRQVXUSULVHGLQKLVRUKHUSULYDWH
life by a roving photographer is stripped of his or her transcendency and 
human dignity VLQFH KH RU VKH LV UHGXFHG WR WKH VWDWXV RI µVSHFWDFOH¶ IRU
RWKHUV«7KLVµLQGHFHQF\RIWKHLPDJH¶GHSULYHVWKRVHSKRWRJUDSKHGRIWKHLU
most secret substance.¶116 
 
This rhetorically-loaded passage seems to almost VXJJHVWWKDWSKRWRJUDSKVVWHDORQH¶VVRXO It 
also expressly indicates that this may arise at capture stage, irrespective of subsequent 
publication.  Yet the Aubry dispute focused on publication and the judgment elsewhere implies 
that the image right arises at this stage.117  In any event, the broad protection for image in Aubry 
was distinguished from the English position by Baroness Hale in Campbell.118 
 
To date, English law has paid limited attention to photographic capture, and it has been deemed 
intrusive per se only in very limited circumstances.  Extracting and articulating the legal 
principles relevant to capture alone is difficult for two reasons.  First, as the title of the action 
LPSOLHV µPLVXVH RI SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ DVVXPHV WKDW VRPH IRUP RI LQIRUPDWLRQ HJ D
photograph) already exists, and the doctrine is solely concerned with preventing or remedying 
its misuse.  It is therefore relatively silent on information-gathering actions such as 
photographic capture119 because it assumes they have already occurred.  Consistent with this, 
03,¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ WHVW tends to entail courts asking whether the claimant has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to information about their activities, e.g. a 
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 Moreham (n 42) 360. 
26 
 
photograph,120 as distinct from a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to their activities 
per se. 121   The former phrasing assumes photographic capture has already occurred and 
potentially vests a prima face privacy right in that information; in contrast, the latter vests a 
prima facie privacy right in the activities, thus leaving open the possibility that photographic 
capture of them may engage Art 8.  Second, difficulties are caused by vagueness in the 
reasonable expectation test.122  This is strongly context-EDVHGLQYROYLQJDQµLQWHQVHIRFXV¶RQ
relevant facts as listed in Murray,123 but many of these factors are arguably relevant to both 
capture and publication.  
 
Despite such difficulties, it can be discerned that photographic capture assumes a legal 
significance in four limited circumstances in English law.  First, photographs of children as a 
blanket category are subject to tighter Art 8 restrictions.124  The explicit aim is to protect 
children from intrusive media attention, and the Court of Appeal in Murray expressly indicated 
that this includes capture as well as publication.125  Second, photographs of an individual 
engaged in intimate sexual activity are viewed by courts as highly sensitive.126  The illicit 
capture of such images is viewed as very intrusive,127 and even if initially taken with consent, 
publication of such images will be restricted in the event of a later privacy dispute.128  Third, 
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capture becomes a relevant factor where the disputed photograph has been taken in 
circumstances of paparazzi harassment.129  )RXUWKµWKHDEVHQFHRIFRQVHQWDQGZKHWKHULWZDV
known or could bHLQIHUUHG¶LVDMurray factor that expressly refers to consent at the time of 
photographic capture,130 though this factor may also be relevant at rights-balancing stage.131  
Eady J in Mosley provided isolated recognition of the Art 8 implications of covert capture in 
itself, VWDWLQJ WKDW µthe clandestine recording of sexual activity on private property must be 
taken to engage Art.8¶132  Yet other cases indicate that the presence or absence of consent to 
recording is afforded variable weight in English law.133 
 
Summary  
The continental starting point is that Art 8 provides DULJKWWRFRQWURORQH¶VLPDJH in principle, 
whilst the traditional British starting point has been that one does not generally have such a 
right.  This apparent potential divergence of approach between ECtHR and English 
jurisprudence remains to be further tested or clarified in the courts, and in any event may fall 
within the margin of appreciation allowed to member states, particularly in the light of the 
consistency of ultimate outcomes in many cases.  The potential discrepancy is apparent at 
photographic capture stage, though very few disputes concern capture alone because in practice 
they tend not to be litigated at this stage; judicial attention is thus inevitably more focused upon 
the Art 8 implications of publication.  Yet photographic recording ± as distinct from publication 
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± may become an increasingly important issue with the ubiquity of mobile phone cameras and 
DFFRPSDQ\LQJµFDSWXUH¶FXOWXUH 
 
The continental personality-based approaFK LV HYLGHQWO\ PRUH LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH µVSLULWXDO¶
intrusion metaphor; there is something DERXW WKH SKRWRJUDSKLF FDSWXUH RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
DSSHDUDQFHWKDWPD\WUDQVJUHVVWKHLUµLQQHU¶VHOIVSLULWRUGLJQLW\DVLGHIURPDQ\HPRWLRQDO
harm that may be caused.  The Reklos court acknowledged the power/knowledge implications 
of the photograph as a record, irrespective of what is done with it.  Capture records an attribute 
RIWKHVXEMHFW¶VSHUVRQDOLW\IXUWKHUPRUHWKLVUHFRUGRISHUVRQDOLW\LVEH\RQGWKHcontrol of the 
subject.  More generally, the personality-based approach assumes a continuous intrinsic link 
betweHQRQH¶VYLVXDOLPDJHDVDQH[SUHVVLRQRISHUVRQDOLW\DQGRQH¶VLQQHUself.  This tends 
towards potentially stronger protection for image as photographs are more likely to transgress 
XSRQRQH¶Vinner self.   
 
The English position towards image appears more qualified; English privacy law largely 
chooses to ignore photographic capture.  Notions of personality have a limited influence and, 
DVLGH IURP RFFDVLRQDO IOHHWLQJ UHIHUHQFHV WR GLJQLW\ DQ\ H[SUHVV µVSLULWXDO¶ UHIHUHQFHV RU
connotations are entirely absent.  Judges also express concern that greater protection for 
subjects of photography entails the creatiRQRIDQµLPDJHULJKW¶.134  However, English law also 
appears less clear on the issue of capture.  Capture per se may be deemed intrusive in limited 
circumstances, e.g. where there is parazzi harassment or covert capture of intimate activity.  
Beyond this, select circumstances surrounding photographic capture may influence both stages 
of the MPI test, but the weighting of these factors is highly variable.  Further clarification on 
this issue of capture in English law is needed. 
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[3] Photographs & Article 8: The Intrusion of Publication 
 
Despite the apparent divergence in approach to Article 8 protection for image discussed in part 
2, the medium of photography is a relevant factor for both the ECtHR and English courts at 
publication stage.  Upon publication, photography is viewed as a medium that exacerbates an 
intrusion, or even in certain circumstances creates an intrusion that would not otherwise arise.  
As Nicol J stated in Ferdinand,   
 
µPublication of photographs can constitute an unacceptable intrusion into 
privacy even if a verbal report of the same occasion would not. Von 
Hannover, Campbell, and Murray are all examples.¶135 
 
What are the unique features of photography as a medium that make it intrusive when an 
alternative medium would not be?  The remainder of this article analyses depictions of the 
medium by judges and cultural commentators to articulate why WKHPHGLXPLVGHHPHGµVSHFLDO¶
and particularly intrusive when published, as well as considering the impact of digital 
technologies in this area. 
 
But two points about the courts¶ approach to publication should be initially noted.  First, the 
photographic medium, though relevant, is just one of a range of factors that courts consider 
when balancing the Art 8 rights of the photographed individual against the Art 10 free 
expression rights of the publisher.  In such FDVHVHDFKFRPSHWLQJULJKWLVµZHLJKWHG¶DFFRUGLQJ 
to the specific circumstances, and the strength of the Art 10 right to disseminate a photograph 
depends upon the extent to which it forms a necessary part of a story that has a public interest 
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justification, e.g. by contributing to a debate of general interest.136  Many of the disputed 
photographs in the cases discussed here form part of stories that do not have this dimension 
and are thus GHHPHGµORZHUTXDOLW\¶tabloid expression,137 or they are seen as extraneous to a 
story that does have a public interest justification.138  Second, though cases discussed here 
primarily concern media publication of photographs for QHZV RU WDEORLG µHQWHUWDLQPHQW¶
purposes, other forms of photography may raise different Art 10 issues.  For example, privately 
commissioned photographs, such as professional wedding shots, are automatically barred from 
publication without consent by UK statute.139  Additionally, artistic expression is afforded 
intermediate importance in Art 10 jurisprudence,140 so photographs exhibited or published for 
such purposes would be afforded greater weight than tabloid-type claims, though MPI has not 
dealt with any such art-based disputes to date. 141 
 
[3.1] Distinctive Features of the Medium 
 
The dissemination of photographic images, as distinct from capture, is the focus of dispute in 
nearly all Art 8 cases.  Claimants seek injunctions to prevent publication or damages where 
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publication has already occurred.  According to judges, three related characteristics of 
photography mark it out as a distinctive, intrusive medium at publication stage.  First, 
photographs capture appearances in great detail; second, they make the audience spectators and 
third, they generally enjoy the status of truth.  Aided by leading cultural theorists, these features 
are now analysed in turn.   
 
Photographic Appearances: Worth 1000 Words?    
 
Photographs capture what a person or events looked like.  In doing so, according to Sontag, 
µWKH FDPHUD KDV « >HIIHFWHG@ D WUHPHQGRXV SURPRWLRQ RI WKH YDOXH RI DSSHDUDQFHV
Appearances as the camera records them¶142  Berger also makes the point that photographs 
depict appearances, µZLWKDOO WKHFUHGLELOLW\DQGJUDYLW\ZHQRUPDOO\OHQGWRDSSHDUDQFHV± 
prised away from their meaning¶143   Both critics seem to employ an implicit distinction 
EHWZHHQWKHµDSSHDUDQFHV¶WKHVXUIDFHGHSLFWHGE\SKRWRJUDSKVDQGDQXQVSRNHQµUHDOLW\¶WR
which the medium is applied.  By privileging µDSSHDUDQFHV¶, they suggest that photographs 
change how we see and what we value, matters afforded further discussion in this part. 
 
)XUWKHUPRUH SKRWRJUDSKV DUH µLQIRUPDWLRQ ULFK¶ DQG SURYLGH PRUH GHWDLO WKDQ WH[W-based 
information.  Judicial acknowledgement of this is evidenced by recurring judicial use of the 
FRPPRQSODFHPD[LPµDSLFWXUHLVZRUWKDWKRXVDQG ZRUGV¶)RUH[DPSOHZKHQWKH&RXUWRI
Appeal discharged an interim injunction to restrain the publication of surreptitiously taken 
wedding photographs in Douglas, Keene LJ stated:  
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µThe photographs conveyed to the public information not otherwise 
truly obtainable, that is to say, what the event and its participants 
looked like.  It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words.  Were 
WKDWQRWVR WKHUHZRXOGQRWEHDPDUNHW IRUPDJD]LQHVOLNHµ+HOOR¶
DQGµ2.¶7KHVDPHUHVXOWLVQRWREWDLQDEOHWKURugh the medium of 
words alone, nor by recollected drawings with their inevitable 
inaccuracy.¶144 
 
Later in Campbell, Lord Nicolls (dissenting) VWDWHGµIn general photographs of people contain 
more information than textual description.  That is why they are more vivid.  That is why they 
are worth a thousand words¶145  Baroness Hale made similar comments regarding the nature 
RISKRWRJUDSKLFLQIRUPDWLRQµ$SLFWXUHLVµZRUWKDWKRXVDQGZRUGV¶EHFDXVHLWDGGVWR WKH
impact of what the words convey; but it also adds to the information given in those words.  If 
nothing else, it tells the reader what everyone looked like¶146  Repeated judicial use of this 
maxim suggests that photographs provide more information than equivalent text, but also that 
they have greater impact and emotional power.  This point has also been acknowledged by the 
ECtHR147 and is replicated in other areas of law, e.g. contempt of court148 and copyright.149   
 
In D v L (2003) Waller LJ briefly stated the principles regarding photographs, suggesting they 
applied similarly to the audio recordings of conversations which were the subject of this 
particular dispute.  He stated:  
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µa photograph is more than the information you get from it.  A court 
may restrain the publication of an improperly obtained photograph 
even if the taker is free to describe the information which the 
photograph provides or even if the information revealed by the 
photograph is in the public domain¶150 
 
:DOOHU/-¶Vcomments provide further confirmation that the photographic medium per se may 
be a factor that determines an Art 8 violation.  Yet such understandings of photographs are not 
unanimous.  For example, in Campbell /RUG+RIIPDQQUHFLWHGWKHµWKRXVDQGZRUGV¶PD[LP
DQG DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW SKRWRJUDSKV DUH µPRUH YLYLG¶ WKDQ ZRUGV  %XW Ke underplayed the 
significance of such a distinction, claiming that the same principles for assessing privacy 
LQYDVLRQVDSSOLHGWRERWKµIn my opinion a photograph is in principle information no different 
from any other information.¶151  Despite this isolated claim, case law clearly indicates a judicial 
consensus that photographs are indeed different, and that their informational richness may pose 
acute privacy implications.  This is arguably because photographs simultaneously provide both 
partial and full information; partial in that they capture only the appearance of one specific 
moment from a flow of events, but also full because they record that moment in a very high 
level of detail.  Yet, intriguingly, a photograph is DOVRµmore than the information you get from 
LW¶ 
 
Photographs Make one a Spectator 
 
0F/XKDQFDWHJRULVHVSKRWRJUDSK\DVDµKRWPHGLXP¶LHµone that extends one single sense 
[in this case, YLVLRQ@LQµKLJKGHILQLWLRQ¶¶.152  By depicting the appearances of people and events 
at a given moment, photographs make one a spectator.  This feature of photographs was briefly 
                                                          
150
 Emphasis added.  D v L [2003] EWCA Civ 1169 [23] (Waller LJ).  Quoted in: Douglas (n 15) [86]; Mosley (n 
16) [18].  See also: Ferdinand (n 107) [101]. 
151
 Campbell (n 14) [72].  See also: [169] (Lord Carswell) 
152
 $XWKRU¶VDGGLWLRQ0F/XKDQ (n 110+RWPHGLDOHDYHOHVVµWREHILOOHGLQRUFRPSOHWHGE\WKHDXGLHQFH¶
24-5. 
34 
 
outlined by Lord Walker in Douglas, who claimed: µThey enable the person viewing the 
photograph to act as a spectator, in some circumstances voyeur would be the more appropriate 
noun, of whatever it is that the photograph depicts.¶153  Lord Nicholls took a similar approach 
when Douglas reached the House of Lords, claiming:   
 
µPhotographs are much the best way of conveying an impression of 
how everybody looked at a wedding. Photographs make one a 
spectator at the wedding. Information communicated in other ways, in 
sketches or descriptive writing or by word of mouth, cannot be so 
complete or accurate.¶154 
 
-XGJHV KHUH DUH HPSOR\LQJ WKH µYLVXDO¶ PRGHO of photography.  On this understanding, the 
photograph delivers detailed visual information about the captured individual to the onlooker, 
in effect placing them at the scene. 155   The act of observation plays a central role in 
understandings of privacy.  For example, Scanlon indicates that privacy norms are concerned 
with not being observed, seen, kept track of etc.,156 FODLPLQJµour conventions of privacy are 
motivated by our interests in being free from specific offensive observations¶157  Similarly 
Gavison, who sees privacy as control over access to ourselves, claims that an individual loses 
privacy ZKHQ WKH\ DUH VXEMHFWHG WR DWWHQWLRQ  µAttention is a primary way of acquiring 
information¶DQG LQFOXGHVHJVWDULQJOLVWHQLQJRURWKHUREVHUYDWLRQ¶158  Benn also argues that 
a minimal right to immunity from uninvited observation is a basic feature of our conception of 
a person.159  So though intrusion need not occur via observation and can occur via other 
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senses,160 it is primarily understood in visual terms.  This emphasis on observation is perhaps 
unsurprising; throughout Western history, from the Greeks to the Enlightenment, human 
thought and culture has privileged the sense of vision, 161  e.g. via the Enlightenment¶V
veneration of the detached empirical observation employed by the sciences.162  Yet in the 
context of privacy, observation raises problematic implications.  This is most aptly highlighted 
by )RXFDXOW¶Vseminal critique of the panoptical gaze in Discipline & Punish163 in which he 
draws out the dominatory potential of seeing.164  )RXFDXOW¶VVXVSLFLRQRIRFXODUFHQWULVPUHFXUV
across a number of his works, and forms part of a tradition of Twentieth Century French theory 
that critiqued vision as alienating and objectifying.165  
 
The objectifying nature of photography is widely acknowledged and is of particular interest to 
feminist writers.166  Barthes pithily summarises its effect thus:    
 
µPhotography transformed subject into object¶167 
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Sontag also expresses concerns about such objectifying tendencies, claiming that photographs 
enable others to see a person in ways that the captured individual cannot, e.g. by revealing faces 
DV µVRFLDO PDVNV¶. 168   3KRWRJUDSK\ µturns people into objects that can be symbolically 
possessed¶ 169  though the possibilities for subjects to resist and disrupt photographic 
objectification in specific contexts must also be acknowledged.170 
 
But just as photographic information is seen as distinct from equivalent textual information, 
some treat photographic seeing as fundamentally different in nature to the act of seeing in daily 
life, i.e. witnessing a scene.  Numerous critics note the impact of photography on the visual 
senses, claiming that it changes how we see.  )RU %HUJHU µPhotography is the process of 
rendering observation self-conscious.¶171  )RU6RQWDJSKRWRJUDSK\µchanged seeing itself, by 
IRVWHULQJWKHLGHDRIVHHLQJIRUVHHLQJ¶VVDNH¶7KHUHVXOWLQJREVHUYDWLRQRIWKHSKRWRJUDSK¶V
audience is detached, even alienated, from the subject matter depicted.172  
 
Consistent with this alternative view, there has been judicial acknowledgment that viewing a 
photograph is materially different from witnessing the live scene.  In Weller v Associated News, 
where the claimant sought damages for publication of photographs of his children walking on 
the streets of Los Angeles, Dingemans J suggested that photographic seeing entails a very 
specific way of viewing that distinguishes it from the observation of a bystander: 
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µThe particular importance attached to photographs in the decided 
cases is, in my judgment, a demonstration of the reality that there is a 
very relevant difference in the potentially intrusive effect of what is 
witnessed by a person [spectator]  on the one hand, and the publication 
of a permanent photographic record on the other hand.¶173 
 
This passage highlights the key difference; photographic seeing entails the viewing of a record; 
unlike actual events, the image is fixed, infinitely reproducible and permanent.  Related to this 
point, a further crucial distinction between regular and photographic vision is offered by 
Benjamin who claims photography can enlarge and capture images beyond natural optics, i.e. 
that would not be within the capacity of ordinary sight.  Additionally, photographic seeing can 
be differentiated by the sheer scale of the potential audience it enables.  The courts do 
acknowledge the potential mass reach of the medium via their recognition, technically at least, 
of each individual act of viewing a photograph.  The approach is illustrated by the Court of 
Appeal in Douglas:    
 
³Insofar as a photograph does more than convey information and 
intrudes on privacy by enabling the viewer to focus on intimate 
personal detail, there will be a fresh intrusion of privacy when each 
additional viewer sees the photograph and even when one who has 
seen a previous publication of the photograph, is confronted by a fresh 
publication of it..´174 
 
This proposition that each additional individual viewing creates a new, separate intrusion 
applies to any private information irrespective of medium. 175   But, by implication, each 
additional viewing of a private photograph remains materially different to, e.g., each additional 
reading of text-based information.  Nevertheless, this quantitative, highly atomistic, liberal 
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conception of dissemination further conflicts with MXGLFLDOUHOLDQFHRQWKHµYLVXDO¶ model that 
equates viewing a photograph to being present at the scene. 
 
The Truth Status of Photographs 
 
A final, crucial characteristic of the photographic medium, its capacity to verify, also becomes 
an issue at dissemination stage and warrants further attention.  Judicial use of photographs as 
verifying evidence occurred with the emergence of the technology in the nineteenth century.176  
Numerous contemporary judicial comments continue such long-standing understandings that 
photographs provide evidence in a disputed story.  For example, in Campbell Lord Hoffmann 
accepted that photographs in the disputed story were necessary to provide verification177 and 
Lord Carswell deemed the accompanying photographV D µSRZHUIXO SURS¶ WR WKH ZULWWHQ
article.178  In Douglas Lord Nicholls stated that photographs are more complete and accurate 
than other forms of information179 and his fellow dissenter Lord Walker claimed 
 
µPhotographs are also regarded (despite the ample opportunities for 
manipulation which modern technology affords) as providing powerful 
corroboration of written reports of conduct which the person 
photographed might wish to deny.¶180 
 
The ECtHR also noted this verifying capacity of photographs in Von Hannover (No 2)181  
Despite such widespread judicial views, various essayists question the basic relation between 
                                                          
176
 )RUDQH[FHOOHQWGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHKLVWRU\RISKRWRJUDSKVLQWKHFRXUWURRPVHH-HQQLIHU0QRRNLQµ7KH,PDJH
of Truth: Photographic EvidHQFH	WKH3RZHURI$QDORJ\¶<DOH-RXUQDORI/DZ	+XPDQLWLHV9RO
10(1), 1-74 
177
 Campbell (n 14) [63] (Lord Hoffmann) 
178
 ibid [165] (Lord Carswell) 
179
 Douglas (n 16) [251] (Lord Nicholls) 
180
 He goes on to say this is not that sort of case. ibid [288] 
181
 7KH(&W+5XSKHOGWKH*HUPDQFRXUW¶VILQGLQJWKDWWKHSKRWRJUDSKVLQWKDWDUWLFOHµsupported and illustrated 
the information being conveyed¶ DQG µthere was a sufficiently close link between the photo and the event 
described in the article.¶9RQ+DQQRYHUNo 2) (n 18) [117].  The proximity of the photograph to the relevant 
story of general interest was also noted as a factor in Rothe (n 7) [57].  See also: Couderc (n 103) [135].  But 
LQ5LFKDUGWKHFRXUWKHOGWKDWILOPIRRWDJHRIDSROLFHVHDUFKRIWKHFODLPDQW¶VSURSHUW\GLGQRWYHULI\DQ\
useful or important aspect of the disputed story - it simply created unnecessary drama: Richard (n 70) [300]. 
39 
 
photographs and truth, suggesting that it is more ambiguous than these judicial comments 
indicate.  In particular, what precisely can a photograph verify?  And to what extent does 
photography transparently record events as distinct from constructing them?182  These two 
issues will be discussed in turn. 
 
/LNHWKHMXGJHVRXWOLQHGDERYHPDQ\FXOWXUDOWKHRULVWVDFNQRZOHGJHDSKRWRJUDSK¶Vevidential 
force, albeit in qualified, ambivalent terms.  Sontag sSHDNVRIµthe presumption of veracity that 
gives all photographs authority¶.183  Berger summarises the position thus:  
 
µIn itself the photograph cannot lie, but, by the same token, it cannot 
tell the truth; or rather, the truth it does tell, the truth it can by itself 
defend, is a limited one.¶184   
 
Berger claims this is particularly the case when photographs are used for communication 
purposes as distinct from official, identity functions (e.g. passports).185  But what is the limited 
truth that photographs can provide?  Barthes explains that the photographs can verify that at a 
specific point in time the subject matter captured was indeed present: 
 
µPhotography never lies: or rather, it can lie as to the meaning of the 
WKLQJ«QHYHUDVWRLWVH[LVWHQFH¶186 
 
The view that photographs are weak in meaning despite their informational richness is shared 
by Berger.  He depicts a reciprocal, symbiotic relationship between text (which photographs 
support and verify) and photographs (that require meaning or interpretation, often afforded by 
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words).187  µTogether the two then become very powerful; an open question appears to have 
been fully answered.¶188 
 
The second issue of whether photography objectively records or subjectively constructs events 
is a longstanding debate within photography literature.  One major factor influencing the view 
that photography objectively documents people and events is the transparency or invisibility of 
the medium itself.189  Sontag claims that photographs seem to be miniature pieces of reality, 
likening them to µa trace, something directly stencilled off the real, like a footprint or a death 
mask.¶190  And Mnookin shows that this view of photographs as direct transcripts of nature was 
one of two competing paradigms employed by nineteenth century U.S. courts to understand 
new photographic technology.  This model understood the photograph as an unbiased 
mechanical witness that communicated the truth, and in doing so it minimised or overlooked 
the human role in the process of capture.191 Malkan claims that this transparency assumption 
continues in privacy law;192 SKRWRJUDSKV DUHYLHZHGDVSURYLGLQJ µDQXQFXUWDLQHGZLQGRZ¶
RQWRWKHVXEMHFWZKRLVµFDUHOHVVO\UHYHDOHG193 
 
Despite its apparent objectivity, many cultural commentators argue that a photograph cannot 
be a wholly objective record; it simply represents a subjective interpretation of the world.194  
This is because each photograph rests upon a series of social and cultural variables.  This 
second paradigm identified by Mnookin emphasises photographs as a form of representation, 
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as a human construction and thus fallible; it correspondingly emphasises the various human 
choices involved in taking any photograph.195  For example, the captured image depends upon 
what the individual photographer sees and chooses. 196   Snyder and Allen claim that 
photographers exercise a series of choices over matters such as equipment, camera positions 
and angle, KRZ D VLWXDWLRQ LV µVHW XS¶; they exercise judgment, informed by background 
knowledge and cultural taste, to select what to include and exclude.197  Thus a captured object 
does not have one single image, but an almost infinite number because µThe image is a crafted, 
not a natural, thing. «KRZ>DQREMHFW@ZLOOEHUHSUHVHQWHGLVQHLWKHUQDWXUDOQRUQHFHVVDU\.¶198  
Interestingly, this degree of selection and judgment exercised by the photographer is 
acknowledged in UK FRS\ULJKWODZZKHUHWKHPDNLQJRIVXFKµIUHHDQGFUHDWLYHFKRLFHV¶LV 
deemed to confer the originality required for copyright to subsist in a photograph.199  So 
photographs are inevitably influenced by the wider culture in which they are taken and 
viewed200 and, in turn, come to construct the culture they become part of.  Furthermore, the 
meaning and interpretations attributed to photographs will vary according to surrounding 
context and the indLYLGXDORQORRNHU¶VSRVLWLRQµA photograph changes according to the context 
LQZKLFKLWLVVHHQ«$V:LWWJHQVWHLQDUJXHGIRUZRUGVWKDW the meaning is the use ± so for 
each photograph¶201 
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Three Article 8 cases aptly illustrate WKH LQKHUHQW OLPLWDWLRQV RI D SKRWRJUDSK¶V DELOLW\ WR
verify.202   In Mosley v News Group, the meaning of footage of the claimant engaged in 
uniformed sexual activities with sex workers was bitterly contested.  Did these images depict 
disciplinary role play as the claimant contended, or, as the defendant claimed, did they reveal 
a sinister Nazi theme to the activities which would provide a strong public interest dimension 
favouring the defendant?  The stills and footage were unable in themselves to confirm either 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ 6RXOWLPDWHO\ WKHGHIHQGDQWQHZVSDSHU¶V1D]L WKHPHDOOHJDWLRQVZHUHRQO\
deemed unfounded at trial in light of close examination of the surrounding witness evidence.203  
Similarly the parties in Rothe v Austria disagreed as to the meaning of the disputed photograph 
which showed the applicant, a Catholic church official, kissing a student priest at a party.  The 
applicant had claimed that the photographs could be interpreted in different ways and did not 
prove any homosexual activity, but merely a friendly embrace; any impression of a French kiss 
ZDVµDQRSWLFDOLOOXVLRQ¶204  7KHDSSOLFDQW¶VUHTXHVWWRREWDLQH[SHUWHYLGHQFHLQSKRWRJUDSKLF 
analysis was rejected as the national courts held that the judge could interpret the photographs 
for herself in light of surrounding evidence.  This evidence included a witness who confirmed 
the applicant¶V )UHQFK NLVVLQJ DFWLYLWLHV DW WKH party. 205   In both of these cases, context 
confirmed (or perhaps created) the meaning attributed to the photographs.  A final example of 
context creating meaning is afforded by Bogomolova where the ECtHR agreed that 
XQDXWKRULVHG SXEOLFDWLRQ RI D SKRWRJUDSK RI WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V VRQ RQ DQ DGRSWLRQ EURFKXUH
inferred he was an orphan and created a false and prejudicial impression that he had been 
abandoned.206 
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Elsewhere, tKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIDSKRWRJUDSK¶VDFFXUDF\DUHDOVRQRWHGLQVRPHZKDWDPELYDOHQW
comments by the Court of Appeal in Douglas.  Whilst acknowledging the degree of detail a 
photograph might capture, it went RQWRVWDWHWKDWµA personal photograph can portray, not 
necessarily accurately, the personality and the mood of the subject of the photograph.¶207  
Ultimately then, the dual-nature of photographs must be acknowledged208 and lends weight to 
%DUWKHV¶FODLPWKDWSKRWRJUDSK\LVµDORDGHGHYLGHQFH¶209  The medium is the message, even 
(or perhaps especially) in an apparently transparent one.210 
 
[3.2] Photographic Intrusion: Commodification & Digitisation 
 
The preceding discussion of photography has established that photography creates a permanent, 
LQILQLWHO\ UHSOLFDEOH UHFRUG RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V LPDJH WKDW FDQ EH GLVVHPLQDWHG to the 
objectifying gaze of a mass audience; photography thus enables commodification of the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLPDJH$PRQJVWDXGLHQFHVLQcluding judges), photographs enjoy a truth status, 
fostering the impression that the image is what they would have seen had they been at the scene.  
But the medium also leads viewers to overlook the myriad variables that gave rise to what lies 
within the fUDPH DQG ZKDW OLHV EH\RQG DQG DOVR WKH SKRWRJUDSK¶V LQDELOLW\ WR YHULI\ WKH
meaning of the depicted subject matter (which is reliant on surrounding culture and text etc).  
It is these complexities and ambiguities of the medium that make it so distinctive and 
problematic in privacy terms.  More generally, photography changes our visual culture by 
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fostering seeing for its own sake and alienating audiences from the images they view.  
Photography enables the dissemination of a detailed record of an event that might not otherwise 
have been seen, even by those at the scene.  Photography thus contributes to a vision-based 
culture that lends itself to privacy intrusion as well as increasing practical opportunities for 
intrusive observation.  
 
Courts confirm that publication of photographs may be particularly intrusive (even where 
capture might not be), and they briefly identify features of the medium to explain why.  But 
WKHSDUWLFXODUVHQVHLQZKLFKWKH(&W+5DQG(QJOLVKFRXUWVXVHWKHWHUPµLQWUXVLRQ¶LVXQFOHDU.  
Generally, the term is used in various shifting metaphorical senses that are difficult to pin down, 
including the transgression of the Art 8 right and/or behavioural boundaries but also, on 
occasion, with reference to inner feelings consistent with the µVSLULWXDO¶ PHWDSKRU HJ LQ
PJS,211 Von Hannover (No.1)212 and notably Theakston.213  More specifically, the English 
courts, e.g. in Goodwin214 and CTB215 have suggested that intrusion is a component of Art 8, 
DQGKDYHUHIHUHQFHG0RUHKDP¶VZRUN216 as a basis for this, though they have not elaborated or 
developed it further.   
 
Despite the fact that it does not comfortably accord with the tendencies of English law, the 
continental personality rights tradition and the work of Goffman can offer further insights as 
to why the distinctive features of photographs are so potentially intrusive in an emotional-
spiritual sense.  Both emphasise the µRXWHU¶communal engagement aspect of personality and, 
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crucially, its close reflection of and bearing upon inner VHOIRUµIHOWLGHQWLW\¶7KH\VKRZKRZ
GLVVHPLQDWLRQ RI RQH¶V SKRWRJUDSKLF LPDJH PD\ WUDQVJUHVV XSRQ RQH¶V µLQQHU¶ VSLULWXDO RU 
dignitary core and related autonomy; via publication, the photographed individual loses control 
RIWKLVDVSHFWRIWKHLUµRXWHU¶IDFHRUIDFHVDQGE\LPSOLFDWLRQWKHLUµLQQHU¶IHOWLGHQWLW\ZKLFK
depends on it.   
 
As discussed in Part 2.1, Goffman distinguished EHWZHHQ µLQQHU¶ IHOW LGHQWLW\DQGPXOWLSOH
VKLIWLQJµRXWHU¶VHOYHVWKDWDULVHDFURVVvarious face-to-face social interactions (e.g. professional, 
familial, sexual etc.) and which are facilitated by audience segregation.  Disseminated 
SKRWRJUDSKVFDQFRQWULEXWHWRDSHUVRQ¶VRXWHUIDFHRUIDFHV%XW*RIIPDQQRWHGWKDWIDPH
creates difficulWLHV IRU DXGLHQFH VHJUHJDWLRQ DQG HQWDLOV OHVV FRQWURO RI RQH¶V ELRJUDSK\217  
Photographs take interaction away from the locus of the real-life subject; instead a remote and 
asymmetrical interaction occurs between the viewer and the fixed image (mediated by 
VXUURXQGLQJWH[WDQGFXOWXUH,QWKLVZD\SKRWRJUDSKVHQDEOHRQH¶VHLGRORQs to be subjected 
WRSXEOLFJD]H LQPDQQHUVRQHPD\KDYHQRFRQWURORYHU $SHUVRQ¶VZLGHO\-disseminated 
photographic image may take on alternative meanings which enjoy the statXVRIµWUXWK¶EXW
which the subject has had no involvement in constructing.  These photographs and surrounding 
QDUUDWLYHVIRUPSDUWRIWKHµIDFH¶SURMHFWHGRQWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOW\LQJWKHPWRFRPPRGLILHG
powerful and enduring images that may be at odds with, or indeed represent all too accurately, 
their inner felt identity.  This is not just relevant to traditional reputation-based actions such as 
defamation,218 but forms an integral aspect of privacy itself when understood in personality-
based terms.  It also becomes ever more problematic in the digital era.   
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Though the Art 8 cases discussed here involve traditional media publication, the principles 
have broader application to the digital realm where most photographic dissemination now 
occurs.  Digital technology has effected three material changes to the creation and publication 
of photographs that have implications for this area of law.  First, the technology enables quicker 
and wider dissemination, and its instant, global reach may be resultingly harder to limit or 
control in practice. 219   Second, digital photographs are highly manipulable 220  via widely 
available editing and filter technologies; the constructed (often highly idealised and curated) 
nature of photographs is now a banal feature of online life and suggests greater awareness of 
SKRWRJUDSK\¶VDPELJXRXVUHODWLRQWRWUXWK7KLUGWKHGLJLWDOHUDKDVZLWQHVVHGDSUROLIHUDWLRQ
of photographic dissemination via, e.g. posting on social media sites.  So the privacy 
implications of publication are no longer restricted to public figures or elites, and most 
individuals have a potential stake in whether (and how) law deals with matters of information 
control, self-presentation, and commodification more generally.221  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article set out to ascertain why the courts treat photography as special and intrusive relative 
to other forms of information.  It has come to two related conclusions; the first, about the 
SKRWRJUDSKLFPHGLXPDQGWKHVHFRQGDERXWWKHWHUPLQRORJ\RIµLQWUXVLRQ¶First, though any 
intrusion into privacy will be highly context-specific, this article has examined the distinctive 
properties of photography that may cause or exacerbate intrusion, though these are only 
accorded recognition when publication occurs.  At dissemination stage, there arise significant 
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but overlooked tensions in the medium that mean it is not quite what it seems.  First, 
photographs provide full (i.e. very detailed) and simultaneously partial information (of mere 
appearances at one single moment).  Second, photographs seem to make the viewer a witness 
at the scene despite fundamental differences between observing first-hand and via a fixed, 
framed image with mass reach.  Third, a photograph seems to offer truth, but is also a subjective 
interpretation of events and lacks capacity to verify its own meaning.  Though select judicial 
comments indicate brief, isolated acknowledgement of some of these points, the courts do not 
express an awareness of the inherently ambiguous, variable nature of the medium, lending 
weight to ShHUZLQ¶VFDOOVIRUDµYLVXDOSUXGHQFHLQODZ¶222   
 
6HFRQGGHVSLWHLWVUDQJHRIPHDQLQJVµLQWUXVLRQ¶LVQRWFXUUHQWO\HPSOR\HGLQ$UWFDVHODZ
LQDWHFKQLFDOGRFWULQDOVHQVH%XWLWLVLQVWUXPHQWDOLQFRQVWUXFWLQJDQLQFKRDWHµLQQHUHVVHQFH¶
that recurs in various guises across privacy discourse as the soul or spirit, and that is represented 
in Article 8 case law via the continental notion of personality and the related floating signifier 
RIGLJQLW\%RWKRIWKHVHFRQFHSWVFRQWDLQDOOXVLRQVWRVSLULWHPRWLRQDQGDµVDFUHG¶LQQHUOLIH
they also form WKH FUXFLDO VWDWHG IRXQGDWLRQV IRU $UWLFOH  SURWHFWLRQ  7KLV µLQQHU¶ DVSHFW
features more explicitly in the continental tradition adopted by the ECtHR, as evidenced by its 
Reklos finding that Art 8 can provide protection for image in itself because it is a chief attribute 
of personality.  Such influences are far weaker in English privacy law, but these non-rational 
traces are still subtly at play via fleeting references to dignity and references to feelings of 
intrusion.  Ultimately, then, though contemporary Art 8 jurisprudence certainly does not go as 
IDUDVWRSHUSHWXDWHWKHP\WKWKDWµSKRWRJUDSKVVWHDOVRXOV¶LWGRHVRQRFFDVLRQDGRSWUHDVRQLQJ
that contains echoes of it. 
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187). 
